Introduction
All over Europe new detention centres for immigrants are being or have been built in recent years (Gibney and Hansen 2003; Weber and Bowling 2004; Jesuit Refugee Service 2005; Welch and Schuster 2005; Calavita 2005; De Giorgi 2006; ). In the United States as well, there has been a 'surge in the numbers of undocumented immigrants incarcerated in county jails, federal prisons and immigration detention centers' (Inda 2006: 116; see also Scalia 2002; Ellermann 2005; Amnesty International 2009) . Australia also has a notable capacity to detain asylum seekers and illegal migrants (Burke 2008) . In other words, detention of 'unwanted' migrants is increasingly part and parcel of the governmental regulation of international immigration.
There are two main types of immigration detention (Hailbronner 2007; Cornellise 2010 ): (1) pre-admission detention at the border involving foreigners not admitted to the state's territory -in some countries this includes asylum seekers -and (2) pre-expulsion detention of foreigners whose stay in the territory is or has become unauthorized (hereafter: illegal migrants). This article primarily pertains to the second type of immigration detention.
In most European countries, including the Netherlands, the detention of migrants for these migration-related reasons is defined as administrative detention, a detention modality that is formally not a punishment, and does not require a conviction for a crime.
It is a matter of administrative and not criminal law. Although law stipulates that it be imposed in the interest of 'public order and national safety' 1 , administrative immigration detention is defined as a non-punitive, bureaucratic measure that is meant to enable the enactment of border control: it merely ensures that 'unwanted' migrants can be located 2 and identified and cannot abscond while the expulsion is prepared (cf. Noll 1999: 268) .
Given this rationale, immigration law prescribes that confinement has to be annulled as soon as the migrant's departure has been organised, or if an administrative judge decides that the chances of expulsion are too slim to justify continued detention.
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The question can be raised whether the formal policy framework for administrative immigration detention, in which detention is a non-punitive means to achieve the goal of removing unwanted migrants, constitutes a sufficient explanation for actual detention practices. In this paper we will be looking more closely at the case of the
Netherlands where it appears that immigration detention serves informal social functions that are not codified in law.
There are three main empirical observations in the Netherlands that warrant an Netherlands has increased over the years van Leeuwen 2004a, 2004b) . Thirdly, if expulsion procedures fail, immigrants are released from detention, back on the streets. In the informal lingo in the field of immigration detention this practice has become known as klinkeren -which roughly translates into 'cobbling', i.e.
releasing somebody back onto the cobblestone streets. 'Cobbled' detainees are often reapprehended and detained again in case of continued illegal residence. 3 To these practically 'undeportable deportable immigrants', the detention system risks becoming a revolving door (Leerkes, 2009; Broeders 2009 Broeders , 2010 .
Localisation, identification and documentation of illegal migrants are a sine qua non for their expulsion (Broeders, 2007; Ellermann, 2008) . No country of origin accepts undocumented returnees. Identification with a view to (re-)documenting an illegal migrant, takes place during administrative detention. The observations above indicate that the immigration authorities have great difficulties with the identification of illegal migrants who are reluctant to be sent home, hide their legal identity and have destroyed 3 their papers (Broeders, 2010 There is an extensive scientific literature on the functions of penal detention (for overviews see Rycklak 1990; Garland 1991, Carlsmith and Darley 2002) . This literature provided the 'sensitizing concepts' (Blumer 1954) ) that helped us identify relevant informal functions of immigration detention. The study's empirical basis consisted of policy documents, survey data, administrative data, and fieldwork in a Dutch centre for immigration detention. Empirical observation is crucial to avoid the fallacy of functionalism, i.e. the idea that practice Y must necessarily be functional for actor Z, given interest X, simply because Y can be expected to exert certain beneficial effects for X. It is desirable to demonstrate these effects empirically, for instance by showing that Z aimed for Y because of X (Levy 1968) .
To some extent our distinction between formal and informal functions of immigration detention resembles Robert Merton's (1957) classic distinction between 'manifest' and 'latent' functions. Yet, whereas Merton stressed the unintended nature of latent functions, we allow for the possibility that some informal functions of administrative detention may be intended by the actors in that social field -politicians, policymakers, policemen, immigration judges, illegal migrants -even if such motives are 4 not formalised in law. Thus, detention practices will be analysed "in relation to specific interests, specific social relations, and particular outcomes -bearing in mind what is 'functional' from one point of view may be dysfunctional from another" (Garland 1991: 126) .
In the next section we briefly describe the main functions of penal detention that emerge from the academic literature. We next describe the main characteristics of administrative immigration detention in the Netherlands. In the remainder of the article we explore three possible informal functions, and present some suggestive evidence for each. These alternatives are (1) deterring illegal residence, (2) controlling the negative external effects of (illegal migrant) pauperism and (3) asserting symbolical control over unwanted immigration with a view to upholding popular support and trust in national government.
Functions of penal punishment
The social scientific literature argues that, on the one hand, punishment is meant to reduce deviance. Or, to be more precise, it can be said that practices of punishment are functional for the ideology that punishment decreases deviance, as there is considerable scholarly disagreement on the effectiveness of punishment in reducing deviance. This instrumental or utilitarian function of punishment includes notions of deterrence (punishment and the threat of punishment inhibit crime), rehabilitation (prisons resocialize convicted offenders to prepare for their re-integration in society), and incapacitation (crime levels can be controlled by removing dangerous individuals from society). On the other hand, it is argued that punishment satisfies certain moral needs, regardless of its real or perceived effects on deviance levels. This expressive or deontological function of punishment includes notions of retribution (wrongdoers deserve punishment proportional to the moral wrong committed) and denunciation (law trespassers should be held up to the rest of society and denounced as violators of the rules that define what the society represents (cf . Rychlak 1990: 331) ).
Admittedly, the functions mentioned are to some extent informal. For example, criminal law and penal law do not state that punishment is meant to deter or incapacitate.
5
Yet, contrary to administrative law, most of the functions mentioned are clearly implied in criminal and penal law, and are widely agreed upon in the legal and penal field.
Many criminologists have noted and debated shifts in penal policies and practices concerning the functions of punishment. Under the headings of the 'new penology' (Feely and Simon 1992) and the 'culture of control' (Garland 2001) In this article we will go into the question of whether the development described by the new penology is relevant in the case of illegal migrants in the Netherlands, as administrative immigration detention only started in earnest in the early 1990s. This roughly coincides with the period in which the shift from rehabilitation to incapacitation is supposed to have occurred. We will also relate the other functions of punishment to immigration detention practices in the Netherlands.
Immigration detention in the Netherlands
In (Dünkel et al. 2007: 377) .
The legally allowed length of administrative detention in the Netherlands is long when compared to most other European countries. Whereas in some countries administrative immigration detention is a matter of days, Dutch law has no fixed duration (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 59) . In principle detention can be imposed until expulsion is realised or still remains a possibility. In light of the recent adoption of the European 'Returns Directive', which stipulates that the maximum length of administrative detention shall not exceed 18 months, Dutch law will have to be adapted (Baldaccini 2009 ). Considering that the maximum was set at 18 months, detention practice will not have to change much as detentions of that length are exceptional, although they do occur Clearly, although the official rationale for administrative immigration detention explains part of detention practices -expulsions do certainly take place -, it does not give a full explanation of immigration detention practices. Given the persistence -and widening -of the gap between the large investments in immigration detention and the declining 'proceeds' thereof in terms of expulsions, the policy does seem to lack rationality. Therefore, other explanations for the practice of the administrative detention should be considered.
Deterring illegal residence
Although immigration detention is formally not a punishment, there are strong indications that detainees may experience it as a punishment nonetheless. It may even be hypothesised that administrative detention is meant to be experienced as a punishment, even if politicians and policymakers seldom state this intention explicitly.
Other researchers have already asserted that administrative immigration detention is meant to bring about specific deterrence (Van Kalmthout et al. 2007: 53) . In this view, the regime of administrative detention is intended to increase the pressure on detainees to leave the country and co-operate with the expulsion procedure, just like criminal 9 detention is intended to pressure criminals into law-abiding behaviour. We expand this view by proposing that immigration detention may also be intended as a form of general deterrence. In the latter sense, the perceived threat of administrative detention is meant to deter potential unwanted migrants from violating migration and residence laws, just like the threat of criminal detention is supposed to suppress criminal behaviour in the noncriminal population.
One important reason for the claim that Dutch immigration detention is intended to be punitive is that the regime is modelled after the model of voorlopige hechtenis, i.e.
the detention regime for suspects of serious crimes who are put in custody while awaiting their trial. As a consequence, the administrative detainee has to undergo a similar extent of deprivation as suspected serious criminals, when it comes to opportunities to communicate with the outside world, work, daily routine, choice of food, et cetera.
It could even be argued that administrative immigration detention is more of a punishment than staying in a regular prison, as the actual level of deprivation and degree of separation from local communities are probably higher in the former type of regime (with duration of stay held constant). For instance, although administratively detained immigrants have a right to be visited by family members or volunteers, they have no right to be visited without supervision, which, if it is considered beneficial for the rehabilitation of convicts, is allowed in some prisons. Furthermore, contrary to regular prisons, it is impossible to leave the immigration detention centre under supervision in order to attend important family events, such as attending the funeral of a direct family member. Moreover, in comparison with regular Dutch prisons, immigration detention centres in the Netherlands are characterised by a significantly lower level of facilities when it comes to work and schooling opportunities, sport facilities, and single person cells. All centres have some sporting facilities and some type of day program, but contrary to regular prisons, work opportunities are not always available. Also, it has been noted that there is often a relative lack of medical and legal aid, a risk of overcrowding, and fewer well-qualified staff ; Van Kalmthout and Hofstee-Van der Meulen 2007). Given these differences, it is not surprising that a place in administrative detention is about 20 per cent cheaper than a place in a regular prison. Similarly, we find that a significantly elevated percentage of administratively detained females -and even more so for male detainees -reported having felt unsafe while being detained ( Figure 3 ). These gender differences are consistent with the fact that the detention regime for administratively detained women is less restrictive than for their male counterparts. For instance, female detainees are less likely then male detainees to share a cell with more than one person, and more likely to have access to a shower of their own. 10 Moreover, in some centres for women, the detainees are allowed to do their own cooking and have their children with them.
The differences between immigration detention and regular detention tend to be most pronounced for precisely the dimensions of detention satisfaction where administrative detention centres are objectively outperformed by regular prisons (see the dimensions 'quality of activities', and 'ability to enjoy oneself' in Figure 2 ; see note for details on the scales as there is even reason to think that the scores on 'quality of activities' are an underestimation of the actual difference between regular prisons and the Aliens Custody).
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On the other hand, there is no evidence that unwanted migrants are leaving the 
Managing the external effects of poverty
In the Netherlands, illegal migrants are excluded from formal welfare arrangements and (most) health care, since the Koppelingswet ('Linking Act') was implemented in 1998.
As a consequence, illegal migrants who stay in the Netherlands in spite of its increasingly restrictive policies with regard to illegal residence have become dependent on informal social safety nets in case of unemployment, homelessness and/or illness. Moreover, the aforementioned restrictive policies also seem to increase the extent to which illegal migrants come to depend on relief as such: illegal migrants' labour market and housing market position deteriorated as a consequence of the Koppelingswet and other restrictive measures. 12 This policy-driven increase in social exclusion appears to have resulted in more marginalisation and a rise in (petty) crime among illegal migrants in the Netherlands (Leerkes 2009; Leerkes and Bernasco, 2010) .
In spite of this restrictive legal framework, and partly because of it, substantial numbers of illegal migrants manage to be supported by non-governmental organisations.
A 2002 case study in The Hague and Leiden revealed that there was considerable solidarity with illegal migrants at the local level (Rusinovic et al. 2002; Van der Leun 2003 A considerable number of the members of this group are difficult to expel, because, as has been said, they manage to keep their identities secret, but also in part because countries of origin appear to be reluctant to take such marginalised illegal migrants back. They are also less likely to be granted residence rights under legalisation programmes which tend, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, to exclude migrants who have been convicted of crimes. Set against the background of previous regularisations in the Netherlands -there have been a few regularisations, but these were limited and politically contested -this group's chances for regularisation are negligible.
For these reasons, we hypothesise that detention -criminal detention as well as immigration detention -may also be used as a form of 'relief of last resort' for such 14 strongly marginalised illegal migrants. The aforementioned forms of crime and public order disturbances generate anxieties among the established population, but are often not serious enough to lead to criminal imprisonment. In the general population such forms of deviance, such as homelessness, are often taken care of by social workers, or by means of granting unemployment benefits, but for illegal migrants that is increasingly impossible.
As will be elaborated below, our research suggests that the authorities as well as The latter impression may also be confirmed by Figure 2 . Note that the difference in detention satisfaction between administrative and criminal detention is relatively small or non-existent for aspects of detention that may be related to poor relief (material aspects, hygiene, health care). It may also be that women, in particular, find relief and protection in centres for immigration detention.
In some respects, these practices share similarities with the poorhouses of the past, particularly the earliest variants such as the houses of correction or workhouses. The latter institutions were also meant to control the external effects of pauperism and were similarly characterised by a strong measure of social control and repression (Katz 1986; Wagner 2005) . The current detention practices, however, are directed at aliens, at 'outsiders', and not at insiders. Contrary to the poor houses of the past, the present detention centres are not supposed to reform and discipline 'idle' illegal migrants into labour. Rather, they are kept off the streets as much as possible. This difference may also explain why labour is not mandatory in immigration detention.
In short, it appears that immigration detention has become a system of control that incapacitates marginal populations, while ideas of rehabilitation and correction disappear into the background. This is in line with the new penology hypothesis.
Managing popular anxiety and symbolically asserting state control
International migration -especially migration from poorer non-EU countries -has become a highly politicised topic throughout Europe, including the Netherlands. While considerable parts of the established population continue to press for more restrictive policies, other groups advocate a more liberal migration regime. After years of intense debate the Dutch government regularised about 30,000 rejected asylum seekers in 2008.
In general, however, public opinion in the Netherlands has become increasingly negative towards migration from poorer non-EU countries since at least the mid 1990s. It is against this background of popular opinion that we hypothesise that immigration detention is not only intended to facilitate expulsion (the formal framework for immigration detention) and migration decisions (our hypothesis about immigration detention's covert function of deterring illegal residence); it also seems to have the function to regulate the more abstract social unrest regarding unwanted migration. The increase in immigration detention communicates the message that the State is still in control over the geographical (and social) borders that citizens want to maintain.
Admittedly, the poor relief function of administrative detention, which was discussed in the previous section, also addresses social unrest to some extent, but social unrest in connection with pauperism must be distinguished from the more abstract and generalised anxiety about unwanted immigration that concerns us here. This third informal function of immigration detention is akin to the function of punishment as denunciation: it expresses the value that there should be borders demarcating the divide between who belongs to the society and who does not.
Compared to the other informal functions, the denunciation function may be relatively latent, i.e. relevant actors may not realise -or at least openly admit -that immigration detention is functional for denunciation. For this reason, empirical evidence is bound to remain somewhat speculative.
It is clear, however, that an increase in immigration detention is, par excellence, useful to appease citizens about unwanted migration: detention symbolises social exclusion in a straightforward way. Bosworth (quoted in Lee 2007: 850) puts it as follows: '[t]he point is that prisons and detention centers … are singularly useful in the management of non-citizens because they provide both a physical and a symbolic exclusion zone'. Zygmunt Bauman also characterises modern prisons as 'factories of exclusion' and links them with political reactions to popular sentiments: "To posit imprisonment as the crucial strategy in the fight for citizen's safety means addressing the issue in a contemporary idiom, using language readily understood and invoking commonly familiar experience" (Bauman 1998: 121) . Foucault (1977) is well-known for his argument that pre-modern punishments symbolised and glorified the political power of the Monarch. If we are right, immigration detention is -albeit to a more limited extent and with a more modern dramaturgy -being used to symbolise the power of the national State in times of heightened globalisation. In that respect, it is interesting to note that centres for immigration detention -especially the more punitive regimes for men -are spatially overrepresented in the Randstad, the densely populated Western part of the Netherlands. In contrast to this, reception centres for asylum seekers -which send a different message as asylum seekers may be admitted to the Netherlands -tend to be located in sparsely populated areas. 13 Moreover, it appears that most centres for immigration detention symbolise departure in one way or another. There is a final indication for the denunciation function of immigration detention:
whereas the expansion of immigration detention capacity was quite well-communicated to the public, information on expulsion trends is certainly not. 14 The latter information is, as we mentioned in section 3, deeply buried in Ministry of Justice reports, which are not characterised by a very transparent presentation of expulsion figures, to say the least.
Discussion: mixed motives for administrative immigration detention?
Immigrant detention in the Netherlands indeed constitutes a case of mixed motives. Its formal function is still firmly upheld, but does not explain detention practices completely.
It has to be said though, that EU member states, including the Netherlands, have been investing heavily in the construction of new biometric identification systems to 'break down the anonymity' of illegal migrants (see Broeders 2007 Broeders , 2009 ). This may strengthen the formal function by increasing the number and speed of successful expulsions.
Three informal functions have been discussed: (1) deterring illegal residence, (2) controlling pauperism and (3) symbolically asserting state control. There is an elective affinity between the functions mentioned. In many cases the functions need, and reinforce, each other. For example, in order to address social unrest about unwanted immigration, expulsions should occur, and immigration detention should try to deter illegal residence, but it also helps if nuisance-causing illegal migrants are kept of the street. There is, however, a tension between expulsion, deterrence and the management of popular anxiety on the one hand, and poor relief on the other hand. If administrative detention becomes too 'comfortable' the incentive to co-operate with repatriation is greatly reduced, and the general public will not be convinced that the state is in control over unwanted migration. If, however, immigration detention becomes too harsh, it will
give cause for humanitarian objections, but will also worsen health and behavioural problems among 'cobbled' detainees, thus giving rise to more public order problems and more public anxiety about immigration. For this reason, it is likely that a certain balance between punitive and more humanitarian concerns is and will be considered necessary.
The informal functions mentioned have, in part, developed in relation to the phenomenon of the 'undeportable deportable alien'. This suggests that the institution of immigration detention, like immigration policy in general, is in flux: modern society has not yet found a definitive solution for the presence of migrants who are formally not admitted, but are also difficult to expel. Mixed motives for administrative detention are to some extent the result of different actors -state authorities, local authorities, citizens, illegal migrants -using detention for their own purposes.
There are clear analogies between the three informal functions of immigration detention and the functions of punishment described by the academic literature. Firstly, there is deterrence in immigration detention, even if it is aimed at influencing migration decisions rather than at deterring criminality as usually defined. Secondly, there is incapacitation, even if illegal migrants qualify for incapacitation more easily than citizens and legal denizens, where minor offences and pauperism usually do not lead prolonged periods of detention. Thirdly, there is denunciation, though not primarily in connection
with social values that obtain regardless of legal status -this tends to be more typical of criminal law -but rather in connection with values that are specifically related to 'unwanted' outsiders, expressing the condemnation of immigration and residence without the consent of the body politic.
These analogies question the seemingly clear-cut division between criminal and administrative law. In this connection, our analysis confirms De Giorgi's (2006: 133) claims that practices of detention and expulsion of immigrants are 'formally
administrative' yet 'concretely penal', an opinion that is echoed in Ericson's (2007: 25) notion of 'counter law' in which "the traditional distinctions between the different legal forms of criminal, civil and administrative law" have become blurred. We have shown that there also is a blurring between different types of administrative law in so far as immigration detention regulates pauperism, which, in the legal population, is not controlled by detention to the same extent, and is usually dealt with under administrative law (rules about access to public homeless shelters, unemployment benefits).
The analogies raise the question of why immigrant detention is not integrated in criminal law, and why it tends to be dealt with under administrative law even in countries where illegal residence is defined as a crime (such as Germany). We propose that the explanation lies in two aspects of punishment that are less central in immigration detention. Firstly, the full incorporation in criminal law risks being at odds with the sense of justice and proportionality that underlies notions of punishment as retribution. A detention lasting three, six or even eighteen months on account of the 'mere' crime of illegal residence would contrast strongly with the major -for example violent -crimes usually leading to such a (lengthy) sentence. It would bring illegal residence into a 'league' of crime where it does not belong according to most citizens, but especially in the eyes of criminal judges, academics, human rights organisations, and advocacy groups.
In this sense, administrative law provides the authorities with a flexible instrument of 21 control (in terms of length of detention) that would probably be difficult to obtain under criminal law. If immigration detention would be completely transferred to the latter body of law, Western societies would have to admit that different standards of punishment and governmental control pertain to citizens and (unwanted) non-citizens (see also Walters 2002 , Sayad 2004 ). In the legal and official policy discourse, this difference remains more hidden and implicit (cf. Bosworth, 2007) .
A second obstacle to incorporating illegal residence into criminal law is that it would necessitate the application of a reintegration ideology for offenders committing the 'crime' of illegal residence. Dutch penitentiary law, for example, stipulates that the penitentiary program is supposed to increase the chances of involvement in the regular labour market after release. Such ideals of reformation, even if less pronounced now than a few decades ago, would contradict the official objective of expulsion that is inherent in the legal construction of an 'illegal alien'. Whereas a 'deviant' citizen is supposed to have opportunity to re-earn the status of a 'normal' citizen (this is true for convicts and for other institutionalized groups, such as drug addicts and psychiatric patients), detained illegal migrants are supposed to leave the (national) society, even if it would be possible and -in the case of criminal illegal migrants -deemed necessary to reform the detainee.
(It is conceivable that penitentiary programs would assist reintegration in the country of origin rather than in the country of detention, but so far this is not happening.)
In the future we may see a greater de facto and de jure differentiation in immigration detention. Some informal punitive aspects may become integrated in criminal law, for example by making repeated illegal residence a punishable offense. At the same time, less punitive aspects may be organised in a system of control that is less modelled after criminal detention. While 'undeserving' illegal migrants -i.e. male illegal migrants, criminal illegal migrants, illegal migrants not co-operating with expulsion -are likely to be criminalised further (not only de facto, but also de jure), their 'deserving' counterparts may become decriminalised to a greater extent. Should such a development materialise, that would not be the first time in the history of the prison that institutional differentiation occurred: from the houses of correction, for instance, grew both the modern prison and the more humanitarian poor house (cf. Morris and Rothman 1998).
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There are, in fact, a number of indications that this differentiation is already underway, both in the Netherlands and elsewhere. We already mentioned the gender Ministry of Justice (2008a Justice ( : 21, 2008b . 2 Detention may also be annulled when immigration authorities anticipate that an administrative judge will decide to annul, or when the acting immigration officer considers continued detention unlawful.
